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In the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah 
ASIE J. WEBB, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
OLIN MATHIESON CHEMICAL 
CORPORATION, 
Defendan.t and Appellant. 
Case No. 8872 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
BRIEF OF 
DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts involved in this action are set forth accur-
ately on pages one to three of the appellant's original brief. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN OVERLOOKING CON-
TROLLING AUTHORITY O·N THE SUBJECT MAT-
TER OF THIS CASE SET FORTH AS FOLLOWS IN 
THE UTAH CASE OF BENNETT V. PILOT PROD-
UCTS COMPANY, 235 P. (2) 525: 
((The manufacturer is at least entitled to as-
sume that the chattel will be put to a normal use 
by a normal user, and is not subject to liability 
where it would ordinarily be safe, but injury re-
sults from some unusual use or some personal idi-
osyncrasy of the consumer." 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN OVERLOOKING OR 
MISINTERPRETING OR MISAPPREHENDING MA-
TERIAL FACTS IN THE RECORD. 
POINT III 
NEW CASES DECIDED IN 1958 SHOULD BE 
CONSIDERED. 
POINT IV 
GENERAL GROUNDS FOR REHEARING. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN OVERLOOKING CON-
TROLLING AUTHORITY IN UTAH ON THE 
SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS CASE. 
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Counsel failed to cite in his original brief, and the 
Court apparently failed to consider the case of Bennett 
v. Pilot Products Company, 23 5 P. (2) 525, a Utah case 
decided in 1951. 
In that case the plaintiff, a beautician, brought ac-
tion against the seller for negligence in distributing with-
out warnings a permanent wave lotion which plaintiff 
claimed to be unfit for the use for which it was intended 
and charged that it contained irritants dangerous to 
users, which fact seller knew or should have known, and 
which irritants injured the beautician who used the lotion. 
The appeal was from an order of the trial court 
granting a motion for non-suit. The judgment of the 
trial court was affirmed. 
The facts in the case revealed that the beautician, in-
stead of using the lotion in the manner in which it was 
intended to be used, added to it a fixative. Patch tests 
conducted revealed that the plaintiff did not react unfav-
orably either to the lotion or the fixative, but did to a 
mixture of the two, and it was an established fact that 
using the two mixed together resulted in a serious case 
of dermatitis, necessitating that the plaintiff give up her 
business as a beautician. Adopting a statement made by 
Dean Prosser in his work on Torts, P. 679, the Court said: 
HThe manufacturer is at least entitled to as-
sume that the chattel will be put to a normal use 
by a normal user, and is not subject to liability 
where it would ordinarily be safe, but injury re-
sults from some unusual use or some personal idi-
osyncrasy of the consumer." 
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The Court concluded: 
((Any feeling of sympathy for appellant must 
yield to a common sense application of the rule of 
foreseeability such as is embraced within the above 
quotation of Dean Prosser. We are disposed to 
feel that respondent fairly could not be held to 
have foreseen what in fact happened when the 
thioglycolate (in the lotion) itself harmless to ap-
pellant, in combination with the fixative, equally 
harmless, reacted on her because of an allergic skin, 
in such a way as to result in dermatitis." 
Relating that case to the one at bar, it can be said 
with equal logic that the manufacturer, Olin Mathieson 
Chemical Corporation, could not be fairly held to have 
foreseen that its receiver which it had tested thoroughly 
at the time of its manufacture and found harmless, 
would be separated from the remainder of the gun it was 
designed to serve and made a part of a different contrap-
tion which was so designed as to impose greater stress on 
it than was contemplated and increase the possibility of 
a case separation. 
There is no question that heretofore the law in Utah 
has been as set forth in the Bennett v. Pilot Products 
Company case and as it was set forth in Hewett v. Gen-
eral Tire f5 Rubber Company, 284 P. (2) 471, decided in 
1955. The majority opinion in this case makes reference 
to the General Tire case, but significantly, in quoting 
from it, leaves out the very words in the opinion which 
are applicable to this case. In the opinion in this case filed 
on August 12, 1959, the Court speaking of plaintiff said: 
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uHe seeks recovery under the now well-estab-
lished doctrine which imposes liability upon the 
manufacturer for injuries resulting from defects in 
such a product when it is used in accordance with 
its intended purpose." 
The Court then cited the General Tire case. It is 
interesting to note the language which the Court left out 
in quoting the General Tire case. The whole sentence 
found on page 475 of the decision reads as follows: 
uA manufacturer is liable when he fails to 
exercise reasonable care in the manufacture of a 
chattel which, unless carefully made, involves un-
reasonable risk to those who lawfully use it in a 
manner and for a purpose for which it is manu-
factured." 
The Court in restating that rule in the instant case 
ignored the words and the concept contained in the words 
rrin a manner." The Court's opinion in the case at bar 
overrules that portion of the opinion in the General Tire 
& Rubber Company case. The writer does not know 
whether the Court intended that or not, but that is the 
unmistakable affect of it. It is indisputable from the 
facts of the record that the plaintiff did not use the receiv-
er manufactured by the defendant in a manner for which 
it was manufactured. It was obviously never intended 
by the manufacturer that its receiver should be removed 
from the remainder of the gun and made a part of a poly-
glot ballistics misfit, which was the gun in the plaintiff's 
hands when he was injured. The manufacturer obviously 
never intended or anticipated that its receiver should be 
affixed to a barrel made by a Nevada gunsmith unknown 
to them (and unknown to Mr. Titus, the Utah gunsmith 
who testified), which barrel, according to the undisputed 
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testimony of all the witnesses, was different from the bar-
rel designed to go with the defendant's receiver, which 
contained a chamber longer and an extractor slot deeper 
and wider than that designed to be used with this receiver. 
The manufacturer obviously did not anticipate nor intend 
that this receiver should be used in a remade gun and ex-
pected to support ammunition that was not designed for 
the gun, ammunition that was larger in caliber, ammu-
nition that was prepared by the plaintiff, ammunition 
which included a faster burning, more explosive powder 
than the ammunition designed by the manufacturer for 
use with this receiver and casings that had been thinned 
by repeated use. (See page 125, plaintiff's testimony as 
to thinning of casings) . 
It is utterly and absolutely specious to say that the 
defendant's receiver was used in a manner for which it 
was manufactured. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN OVERLOOKING OR 
MISINTERPRETING OR MISAPPREHENDING MA-
TERIAL FACTS IN THE RECORD. 
The manner in which the receiver was used by the 
plaintiff was not only different from the manner in which 
the manufacturer intended it to be used, but it was used 
in a manner which at least may have been the sole proxi-
mate cause or a proximate cause of the injury suffered 
by the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff's counsel in his original brief very properly 
stated as follows on Page 3 1 : 
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rrw e will agree that if any modifications made 
on the gun after it left the factory in any way in-
creased the strain on the receiver and increased its 
tendency to blow up, such would be a defense." 
The writer submits, and will later document the fact 
that the undisputed evidence is that the modifications 
made on the gun after it left the factory increased the 
strain on the receiver by increasing the possibility of a 
case separation, which occurred. It was the undisputed 
evidence of all the experts who testified with regard to 
the matter that if the extractor slot in the barrel was deep-
er, that is, longer, it would remove some support from the 
cartridge and increase the possibility of a case separation. 
There were four expert witnesses who testified with re-
gard to that matter: the plaintiff's Mr. Casull and the de-
fendant's Mr. Morgan, Mr. Speer and Mr. Titus. As 
set forth in this Court's opinion in this case, Mr. Casull 
uadmitted on cross-examination that if the extractor slot 
of the gun was deeper (longer) more of the cartridge 
case would be exposed and thus increase the danger of it 
rupturing." As indicated in the opinion, Mr. Morgan, 
Mr. Speer and Mr. Titus testified to the same effect, that 
is, if the extractor slot were deeper, it would increase the 
possibility of a rupture of the casing. Therefore, the evi-
dence on that issue is undisputed. Mr. Casull testified 
that he did not measure the depth of the extractor slot 
and did not know whether it was deeper or not. Messrs. 
Morgan, Speer and Titus said that it was deeper. There-
fore the evidence is undisputed on the point that it was 
deeper. When Mr. Casull later said that he did not be-
lieve this different extractor slot would contribute to the 
case separation, he was not basing his opinion on the un-
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disputed evidence. If he had based his opm10n on the 
undisputed evidence, which was to the effect that the ex-
tractor slot was deeper, then he would have had to say, 
to be consistent with his statement on cross-examination, 
that the new extractor slot did increase the danger of a 
case separation. 
A most extraordinary position is taken by this Court 
in the following statement in its opinion: 
((The negligible effect of this small increase 
in depth seems apparent when it is remembered 
that the slot runs around only a portion of the cir-
cumference of the barrel." 
Such a statement is incredible because by it the ma-
jority of this Court assume the role of gunsmiths and phy-
sicists and substitute their expert opinion for the opinion 
of the four and only experts who testified on that subject 
in this case. With that statement, the majority of this 
Court is saying to the people who have been manufactur-
ing the Winchester rifle for seventy-five years, ((What is 
all this nonsense about a fraction of an inch? After all 
you are only dealing with 40,000 or 50,000 or 60,000 
pounds of pressure per square inch, so why waste your 
time using micrometers? Exposing a little more of the 
thin metal of the cartridge case to such pressure is rnegli-
gible.'" 
Additional indisputable evidence that the modifica-
tion of the gun was a factor in causing the accident is 
found in the fact that when the gun was used in the 
manner intended by the manufacturer, no cartridge case 
ruptured and the receiver did not break. The evidence 
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supporting that fact is in two parts; first, the evidence 
is that this particular rifle was tested thoroughly at the 
factory. The undisputed testimony with regard to that 
testing is set forth on pages 164 through 173 of the record, 
and on pages 8, 9, 1 0 and 11 of the appellant's original 
brief. 
Mr. Morgan testified that the factory ammunition to 
be used in this gun is not designed to produce more than 
54,000 pounds pressure per square inch, but in testing 
the gun, charges were fired in it which produced sub-
stantially more pressure than that. He said on page 169 
of the record that in the case of this rifle they used a 
uproof cartridge developing from 70,000 to 70,500 
pounds on the average," or at least, he said, ((17,000 
pounds higher in the proof load than in the commercial 
ammunition." Then on page 171 of the record, Mr. 
Morgan said: 
((We recognize the fact that when we subject 
any gun to pressure in excess of 70,000 pounds 
there is an element of danger involved, but we are 
deliberately trying to destroy this gun if it is 
defective, and in order to safeguard our people we 
have an extremely heavy wood box with an ap-
propriate rest inside of it which the gun is put 
into, in it recoils, so that the stock will leap up and 
the recoil is stopped. 
uThe definitive proof cartridge is a clearly 
identified cartridge. It is not brass, brass like the 
ammunition you buy. It is cadmium plated and 
is laquered in brilliant red. 
((The gun is laid in the rest, the cartridge is 
inserted in the chamber, the bolt is closed, and then 
this heavy box is pulled down over the entire gun 
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so that it is enclosed. The man reaches in through 
a little vent or a hole with an iron hook about 
three feet long and pulls the trigger while the gun 
is enclosed in the box. Some, of course, explode." 
Mr. Morgan had the card which evidenced the fact 
that these spe-cific tests were made on this specific gun; 
that the receiver withstood the pressure; that it passed 
that and other tests evidencing that it was a standard, un-
defective, safe receiver when it left the factory if it was 
used in the manner in which it was intended that it 
should be used. 
The second irrefutable item of evidence that the re-
ceiver was safe as long as it was used in the manner in 
which it was intended to be used is the fact that the plain-
tiff fired ((90 to 100 rounds" in the gun prior to the time 
that he first had it rebarreled, and the receiver performed 
its function safely and without incident. 
Plaintiff's counsel will ·Contest this last item of evi-
dence. The fact is that, according to the court reporter 
who took Mr. Webb's deposition, Webb testified on de-
position that he fired 90 to 100 rounds in the gun without 
incident prior to the time that he had the gun rebarreled 
the first time by Mr. Ackley. The fact that the court 
reporter so recorded his testimony on deposition appears 
in the record in this case on pages 13 2 to 13 5. Accord-
ing to the .court reporter, Mr. Webb, the plaintiff, testi-
fied as follows: 
uQ. How many rounds of ammunition did you 
fire through the rifle in between the time you 
purchased it, and the time you took it to Ack-
ley, say, in May of 1955? 
uA. Less than a hundred rounds. 
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ttQ. Well, that could be zero? 
etA. Yes, it could. 
uQ. Would you give me some idea? 
ttA. Oh, let's say, ninety to a hundred rounds. 
ttQ. And where was that firing done? 
ttA. Up at the rifle range, police range here, and in 
the field. Most of it was test work at the 
rifle range." 
Mr. Rampton contended at the trial that the first 
answer indicated above, uless than one hundred rounds," 
was a typographical error, and that it had been changed 
by Mr. Webb when he read the deposition; that the 
words ((less than a hundred rounds" had been stricken by 
Mr. Webb, and the word ((none" had been substituted by 
Mr. Webb on the ridiculous grounds that the reporter had 
made a typographical error. However, Mr. Rampton 
admitted that his later answer, ttOh, let's say, ninety to a 
hundred rounds" had not been changed by Mr. Webb, 
and I assume, therefore, was not a typographical error. 
Mr. Webb, of course, changed his testimony at the 
trial after seeing the damaging nature of the truth he had 
told at the time of the deposition. At the trial he told the 
obviously unlikely story that he bought this gun, retained 
it over two weeks and never fired a shot out of it until he 
had it rebarreled. 
In the case of Bennett v. Pilot Products Company, 
supra, the Court was faced with a similar incident. In 
that case, the plaintiff had changed her testimony at the 
trial from that which she had given on deposition. In 
that case, at trial, the plaintiff claimed that the applica-
tion of the· lotion had caused injury to her partner's 
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hands, and at the trial her partner had confirmed that 
testimony. The court said: 
({Significantly, on cross-examination, she 
(plaintiff) admitted having testified previously on 
deposition that her partner had not suffered any 
injury from such use. Significant also is the fact 
that her partner failed to testify on deposition that 
she was affected by use of the products." 
The precedent enunciated in that case entitles the 
court to place significance in this case on the difference 
between the plaintiff's testimony on deposition and his 
testimony at the trial. 
The receiver performed adequately and safely as long 
as it was used in the manner in which it was intended to 
be used. 
POINT III 
NEW CASES DECIDED IN 1958 SHOULD BE 
CONSIDERED. 
There are two recent cases which are analogous to 
the extent that they should be considered by this Court 
on rehearing. They are both cases in which the manu-
facturer or seller was charged with negligence, and in 
which there was an intervening act on the part of the 
plaintiff buyer which could be described either as uusing 
the chattel in a manner in which it was not intended to 
be used" or ttcontributory negligence on the part of the 
plaintiff buyer." In both cases, the Court held that the 
seller or manufacturer was not to be held liable. 
One of those cases is Rawls v. Zigler, 107 So. (2) 601, 
a Florida case. A motorist and wife brought action to 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
recover for injuries sustained in a collision occurring when 
a truck sideswiped their automobile. The action was 
brought against the driver and owner and seller of the 
truck and against a partnership hired by the seller to 
mount a body on the truck. The negligence charged 
against the seller and the partnership hired to mount the 
body on the truck was that the body mounted on the 
truck was designed to hold a greater load than the truck 
was designed to hold; that the body was overloaded and 
because of that, it came loose from the truck and moved in 
such a manner as to cause a collision with the plaintiff's 
automobile. 
The negligence charged against the plaintiffs, which 
it was believed contributed to the accident, was the opera-
tion of their automobile with defective brakes. 
Summary judgment in favor of the seller and part-
nership was entered by the trial court and the plaintiffs 
appealed. The appellate court upheld the trial court de-
CISion. 
The language of the court found on page 607 is 
strikingly significant when it is considered in the light of 
the facts of the case at bar. 
The Court said: 
((But the statements of the witnesses * * ~­
showed clearly that the overloading of the truck 
on the built up springs could not reasonably be 
found to be the sole cause of the accident. (Em-
phasis supplied). Concurring in the end result 
were the brake failure (or the failure of Paul 
Zigler (plaintiff) to operate the brakes properly) 
at what might have been an excessive speed in the 
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circumstances, followed by some exceptioned force 
applied to the rivets, such as the sudden swerving 
of the truck or its impact with the car. Regard-
less of whether the jury may subsequently exone-
rate Paul Zigler (plaintiff) of negligence (as to 
which we express no opinion) , the fact remains 
that, superimposed upon the negligence, if any, 
of Luby (defendant seller) were independent 
intervening forces without which the accident 
would not have occurred. These hazards might 
have been foreseen by Luby as remote possibilities; 
but we have found no case, and none has been 
cited, holding that a manufacturer or supplier, or 
any other defendant, must cpay off' for failure to 
foresee a remote eventuality." 
The other very recent case is Tohan v. Joseph T. 
Ryerson f5 Son, Inc., et al, 165 Fed. Supp. 638. This case 
was decided by the United States District Court of the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 1958. 
In this case the plaintiffs' employer purchased two 
I beams from the defendant, and when the I beams were 
put into use to support a scaffold, they bent and upset the 
scaffold so that the plaintiffs fell from the scaffold and 
were injured. It was charged by the plaintiffs that the I 
beams sold by the defendant were not suitable for the job 
for which the defendant sold them. The court found that 
if the plaintiffs' employer who purchased the beams had 
braced the beams properly, they would not have bent and 
the accident would not have occurred. The Court said: 
ttThere was no obligation upon Ryerson (the 
seller) to foresee that simple ordinary precautions 
would not be taken to keep the beams in proper 
position and to prevent the very thing that hap-
pened." 
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The Court in making its ruling referred to the Re-
statement and said: 
((Section 401 of the Restatement of Torts 
does not impose the responsibility upon a vendor 
to anticipate an improper use of an otherwise ade-
quate chattel. The negligence which caused the 
accident was that of Custodis (the employer) 
solely and not of Ryerson. Therefore the verdict 
against Ryerson cannot stand." 
Earlier in its opinion, the Court said: 
((The court, after a review of the entire case, 
agrees with the position taken by Ryerson that it 
had (no reason to know' that the beams would be 
used without Custodis taking simple precautions 
in their use to prevent harm to its employees. From 
all the evidence the conclusion is inescapable that 
the beams were suitable for the purpose for which 
they were sold. They had functioned adequately 
for a period of two weeks and under circumstances 
wherein much greater stress and weight than at 
the time of the accident had been placed upon 
them." (Emphasis supplied.) 
The application of this case to the one at bar is ob-
vious. The receiver involved had functioned adequately 
prior to the time that it was rebarreled, and in the factory 
it had been subjected to much greater stress than would 
be imposed upon it had it not been for the modification 
of its use by the plaintiff. 
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POINT IV 
GENERAL GROUNDS FOR REHEARING. 
Counsel is cognizant of the fact that a rehearing is 
not for the purpose of reviewing and rearguing matters 
already fully considered at the time of the initial argu-
ment before the Court. He recognizes also that no new 
issues may be introduced, but that if the Court has over-
looked or misinterpreted or misapprehended significant 
authority or material facts which relate to issues which 
were included in the briefs or arguments of the parties, 
then the Court is justified in granting a rehearing. 
The cases cited briefly below set forth the general 
purpose of rehearing and the grounds upon which a Court 
is justified in its discretion to grant a rehearing. The ap-
pellant submits that the errors cited above are such as obli-
gate the Court to grant a rehearing under the standards 
set forth in the cases below. 
In the case of Hadrian v. Milwaukee Electric Rail-
way f5 Transport Company, 3 N. W. (2) 700, 241 Wis. 
122, modified 5 N. W. (2) 765, 241 Wis. 122, the court 
granted a rehearing in the tort case due to the fact that 
the court believed that it had perhaps overlooked impor-
tant facts in its previous consideration of the case. 
The case was one in which a woman sustained in-
juries when struck by a train of two street cars from 
which she had alighted. Rehearing was granted for re-
argument of the issue as to whether blood stains sepa-
rately or in connection with other facts bearing on the 
location of the woman at and after the accident con-
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stituted ((physical factsn contrary to testimony given by 
the woman and others that she was on the elevated portion 
of a safety zone when struck. 
In the case of Basso v. V eysey, 110 Ad. ( 2) 70 6, the 
court said: 
((The purpose of a motion for reargument is to 
point out matters presented in the briefs and relied 
upon in the original argument which it is thought 
were overlooked or misapprehended by the court 
in reviewing the case." 
In City of Milwaukee v. Public Service Commission, 
47 N. W. (2) 298, 259 Wis. 30, the court said: 
.. A petition for rehearing is ordinarily for the pur-
pose of directing attention to matters said to have 
been overlooked or mistakenly conceived in the 
original decision, and thus invites a reconsidera-
tion upon the record upon which that decision 
rested." 
In Crawford v. Bach, 101 N. E. (2) 144, an Ohio 
case, the court said: 
HI£ the court has failed to consider some material 
question or has overlooked some controlling au-
thority or principle of law, it will entertain such 
an application." (for rehearing). 
In U. S. Phosphoric Products Corporation v. Lester, 
156 So. 753, 116 Fla. 309, decided in 1934, the Florida 
Supreme Court granted a motion for rehearing ((where 
proof respecting contributory negligence, made the basis 
for judgment denying employee a recovery, was miscon-
ceived." 
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Kirchgestner v. Denver 5 Rio Grande Western Rail-
way Company, 225 P. (2) 754, (Utah 1950) was an 
F.E.L.A. case, in which the court, speaking through Jus-
tice Wolfe, said: 
ttlt not being free from doubt what degree of 
proof applies, a rehearing is granted to allow the 
parties to reargue and submit further authority on 
that question." 
CONCLUSION 
The opinion rendered in this case by this Cpurt, if 
not modified, changes radically the present Utah law on 
the subject matter involved, and the opinion establishes 
law that is not recognized in any state of the United 
States. The opinion alters substantially the law enunci-
ated in the cases of Bennett v. Pilot Products Company, 
Hewett v. General Tire 5 Rubber, and Hooper v. General 
Motors Corporation, 260 P. (2) 549, because it removes 
the protection given to the manufacturer in those cases 
where the chattel is not used uin the manner" in which it 
was intended to be used. The opinion promulgated by 
this Court establishes the law in this State to be that if 
there is sufficient evidence to go to the jury as to the 
manufacturer's negligence, then the manufacturer is liable 
regardless of the fact that the chattel was not used in the 
manner in which it was intended to be used. He is, in 
fact, liable even if the chattel is used in a manner which 
he could not reasonably anticipate that it would be used. 
He is liable, in fact, even if it is used in a manner which 
he would not approve and which he would believe to be 
a dangerous use, (the depth of the extractor slot) . 
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The establishment of such a rule of law is inequitable 
and unjust. Under such a rule, what can a manufacturer 
do to protect himself? There is nothing he can do. He 
can devise the most complete, thorough, accurate, fool-
proof system of testing conceivable-one that a Court 
would have to consider was absolutely perfect, and yet it 
would not protect him. In his case the manufacturer had 
established tests based on seventy-five years of experience 
that were obviously thorough and exhaustive, and those 
tests were applied to this particular gun and the adequacy 
of those tests was not questioned nor criticized in any 
manner by the plaintiff in this ·Case. Yet under the ruling 
of the rna jority of this Court, those tests were of no pro-
tection to him whatsoever. 
I submit that the court in its opinion in this case 
either overlooked or misapprehended or misinterpreted 
existing law and material facts in the record; that it mis-
apprehended the far-reaching, drastic, unjust nature of 
the new law which it established. Defendant appeals to the 
Court to reverse its opinion, to reverse the verdict of the 
jury and decide this case in favor of the defendant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
By 
Marvin J. Bertoch 
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